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ABSTRACT
We consider settings where owners of electric vehicles (EVs) par-
ticipate in a market mechanism to charge their vehicles. Existing
work on such mechanisms has typically assumed that participants
are fully rational and can report their preferences accurately to the
mechanism or to a software agent participating on their behalf.
However, this may not be reasonable in settings with non-expert
human end-users. To explore this, we compare a fully expressive
interface that covers the entire space of preferences to two restricted
interfaces that reduce the space of possible options. To enable this
analysis, we develop a novel game that replicates key features of
an abstract EV charging scenario. In two extensive evaluations
with over 300 users, we show that restricting the users’ preferences
significantly reduces the time they spend deliberating. More sur-
prisingly, it also leads to an increase in their utility compared to
the fully expressive interface (up to 70%). Finally, we find that a
reinforcement learning agent displays similar performance trends,
enabling a novel methodology for evaluating market interfaces.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Market mechanisms designed for multi-agent systems hold consid-
erable promise for addressing emerging challenges in future elec-
tricity networks, where supply will increasingly be generated from
intermittent and unreliable renewable sources, and where demand
will increase due to the electrification of transportation [12]. In par-
ticular, recent years have seen a proliferation of interest in electric
vehicles (EVs), generally perceived as a key technology for achiev-
ing sustainable mass transportation with low carbon emissions [14].
However, their widespread use will also place considerable strains
on the existing electricity infrastructure.
To address this, previous work has proposed auction-like mech-
anisms for scheduling the charging of EVs [13, 4]. These achieve
a high efficiency because they take the individual preferences of
drivers (i.e., their availability and willingness to pay) into account
when allocating a limited supply of electricity. Other work relies on
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real-time price signals to incentivise autonomous charging agents
to shift or curtail their consumption when supply is low [11].
However, such approaches assume that the human end-users have
perfect knowledge of their preferences, i.e., they can reason accu-
rately about the value of different amounts of electricity, consid-
ering all possible, often uncertain future opportunities of using it.
This is often not realistic [18, 6]. Moreover, providing the com-
plete preferences is tedious and the associated cost could outweigh
the benefits of doing so [7].
To address this challenge, there has been some work on auctions
with restricted reporting, i.e., where bidders do not report their full
preferences, but rather choose from a restricted messaging space.
Such auctions can lead to equilibria with certain desirable proper-
ties, including higher revenue for the auctioneer [8, 3]. This in-
cludes settings where the messaging space is reduced to a small set
of discrete options, e.g., [1] describes how to select these options to
maximise either social welfare or revenue, and [2] characterises the
associated loss of efficiency. Other work, e.g., [15], considers how
complex preferences can be elicited through an incremental query
process. However, these approaches all assume rational agents and
do not evaluate the auctions with real bidders.
Another strand of work explicitly considers non-expert market
participants. For example, research on hidden market design has
looked at building simple interfaces that hide the rules and pric-
ing mechanisms of a complex underlying market [16]. However,
that work cannot be applied directly to EV charging, as it consid-
ers an exchange market for computational storage without financial
payments. Related to this, [17] has investigated market user inter-
face design. That work focuses on simplifying complex market
interactions by asking users to select from a discrete set of options.
However, it considers a setting with posted prices and is signifi-
cantly simpler than the EV setting. Crucially, neither [16] nor [17]
provides a direct comparison to fully expressive interfaces, which
leaves their relative benefits unclear.
To address these limitations, we conduct the first thorough study
of how to design market interfaces for the EV charging setting, and
we make several novel contributions. First, we formalise the EV
charging setting to capture several real-world challenges that give
rise to complex preferences and we design two restricted interfaces
for reporting preferences in this setting: one that reduces the di-
mensionality of the reporting space (but retains infinitely many op-
tions) and one that restricts the reporting space to a discrete set of
options. To evaluate these interfaces with real users, we then de-
velop a game that serves as an abstract representation of the EV
charging setting. Using this game, we experimentally compare the
restricted interfaces to a fully expressive interface in two large user
studies involving a total of over 300 participants hired on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. We show that the restricted interfaces signifi-
cantly alleviate the participants’ cognitive burden (as measured by
the time they deliberate). More surprisingly, they also lead to a
significantly better performance than the fully expressive interface
(up to 70% in some cases). Furthermore, we show that the choice
of restriction can influence the energy consumption of participants
without decreasing their utility. This indicates that market user in-
terface design is an important topic to enable efficient future energy
markets for end-consumers. Finally, we show that a reinforcement
learning agent replicates general behaviour trends of human play-
ers, potentially paving the way for a new approach for optimising
market interfaces without running large-scale user trials.
2. THE EV CHARGING PROBLEM
In this section, we present an abstract model of the EV charging
problem. Our aim is to capture the key challenges that are in-
herent in the domain, while still retaining a succinct and general
model. More specifically, we capture the following challenges that
are found in realistic settings.
First, electricity has no intrinsic value. Its value instead depends
on how it is utilised to complete journeys. Second, the problem
is of an inherently uncertain nature. On one hand, this is a key
feature of the market itself, as supply and demand may fluctuate
significantly over time. On the other hand, there may be consid-
erable uncertainty over what journeys the driver needs to complete
in the future. Third, there are complementarities, i.e., the driver’s
preferences are typically highly nonlinear over the quantity of elec-
tricity they receive. For example, a driver may require a minimum
overnight charge of 10 kWh to drive to work the next day. Receiv-
ing any less has no value.
Given this, we consider a general setting where EV drivers par-
ticipate in a market mechanism to charge their vehicles. We ab-
stract away from the particular market and assume that a driver
simply reports her preferences for charging to an autonomous agent
at regular intervals (e.g., once a day).1 The agent then participates
in the market on its owner’s behalf and procures electricity for the
vehicle while it is plugged in (e.g., overnight). At the end of the
charging period, the driver can use the vehicle to complete jour-
neys and derives value from doing so.
More formally, the problem consists of a sequence of n days,
D = {1, 2, . . . , n}. An EV starts with a given initial state of
charge (SOC) s1 ∈ [0, smax] (in kWh). Then, at the start of each
day d, the driver reports her charging preferences to an autonomous
agent, which procures electricity from the market to charge the EV.
2.1 Electricity Market
We assume electricity is sold in discrete, unit-sized quantities (we
use 1 kWh, w.l.o.g.). To participate in the market for day d, the
EV driver reports her preferences for each quantity of electricity
to her charging agent. This is done in the form of a preference
report vector wd = [wd,1, wd,2, . . . , wd,smax−sd ], which indicates
the driver’s maximum willingness to pay for a given charge (up to
the maximum capacity) on that day. This structure allows com-
plementarities to be expressed — for example, a preference vector
wd = [0, 4, 5] indicates that the driver is not willing to pay anything
for receiving 1 kWh (e.g., because this is too little to complete any
journeys), she will pay up to $4 for 2 kWh and up to $5 for 3 kWh.
Given this preference vector, the charging agent then participates
in the market and obtains xd(wd) units of electricity at a price
of pd(wd). These are uncertain, depending on the day’s market
1For example market mechanisms, see [11, 13, 4].
conditions (e.g., supply of renewables and fluctuations in aggre-
gate demand), but we assume that the agent maximises the driver’s
utility in expectation, such that truthful reporting is optimal, i.e.,
∀wd, wˆd : E[wd,xd(wd) − pd(wd)] ≥ E[wd,xd(wˆd) − pd(wˆd)],
wherewd is the driver’s true willingness to pay. In practice, this can
be achieved by participating in an incentive compatible mechanism
[13, 4] or by acting strategically on the owner’s behalf, e.g., when
optimising charging decisions given price predictions for real-time
pricing [11]. Throughout the paper we will also assume that an
agent’s charging behaviour could influence prices on the same day,
but has a negligible impact on the market conditions of the follow-
ing days. This is a reasonable assumption in energy markets, where
a single domestic consumer has little impact on future prices.
2.2 EV Utilisation
Given the outcome of the market interaction, the new SOC of the
EV is now s′d = min(sd + xd(wd), smax). This can then be used
by the EV driver to complete journeys. Specifically, every day,
there is a set of potentially available journeys, jd ⊆ J , where
J = {1, 2, . . .} is the set of all journeys. These represent pos-
sible journeys the driver may wish to make during the day (e.g.,
driving to work or to the supermarket). To model realistic scenar-
ios, at the time of reporting preferences, there may be uncertainty
about which journeys will be available (e.g., because they depend
on the weather or because some journeys will only be necessary in
exceptional circumstances). To reflect this uncertainty, a journey
is defined by a probability rj ∈ [0, 1] (we assume these are inde-
pendent, although this can be easily relaxed, as discussed briefly in
Appendix A) and a value vj ∈ R. The value of a journey reflects its
importance to the driver and may represent the inconvenience cost
incurred when missing the journey, or even the cost of alternative
transport (e.g., to travel to work). The sets of potential journeys jd
are known in advance for all days, but the set of actually available
journeys on day d, denoted by j′d ⊆ jd, only becomes known after
charging is complete on that day.
Given the set of journeys j′d, the driver now chooses which sub-
set ad ⊆ j′d of these to complete. Doing so reduces the EV’s SOC,
as given by an appropriate cost function γ : 2J → R≥0 (journeys
that exceed the SOC cannot be completed). Furthermore, the driver
receives the total value of these journeys. Thus, her total utility
is the difference between the overall value derived from journeys
over time horizon D, and the total costs incurred. In the following
sections, we discuss two approaches for solving this optimisation
problem computationally, one is optimal and one is a learning ap-
proach that may be a better model of human behaviour.
2.3 Optimal Solution
To optimise her utility, an EV driver needs to report a preference
vector wd on every day d that expresses the respective expected
utility for receiving each possible quantity of charge. This is a
complex problem, as it needs to take into account the (uncertain)
availability of journeys not only on the current day, but also on fu-
ture days, as well as likely future market conditions, as the battery
of the EV allows the driver to store surplus electricity.
To derive the optimal strategy for a perfectly rational driver, we
will assume that the driver has knowledge about the expected prices
pd(wd) and the distribution of allocations xd(wd) for a given pref-
erence vector. With this, we can model the problem as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP) [5], the full details of which are in Ap-
pendix A. The solution to such an MDP is a policy that selects both
appropriate preference vectors to report to the charging agent and
sets of journeys to complete, depending on the state (the current
day d, the current SOC and the journeys available on a given day).
Solving this MDP optimally is NP-hard in general (as the jour-
ney selection generalises the Knapsack problem), but problems of
realistic sizes can still be solved quickly. This is because we con-
sider a limited time horizon here, allowing the use of backwards
induction and dynamic programming. Furthermore, the possible
journeys that a driver will seriously consider on a given day will
be small, perhaps in the order of a dozen or fewer. We also discre-
tise the state space of the SOC to include all reachable states, given
the cost function γ. Finally, as the charging agent participates in
the market optimally, the optimal preference vector is simply the
driver’s true valuation for each level of charge, and this is obtained
readily from the MDP solution.
2.4 Reinforcement Learning Agent
Clearly, the optimal solution makes some assumptions that are un-
likely to hold in practice (such as knowledge of the distributions of
pd(wd) and xd(wd), and all potential future journeys). Hence, a
second approach for solving the EV driver’s decision problem is to
design a reinforcement learning agent [19] (note this agent is differ-
ent from the agent described above that interacts with the market).
This approach does not require an explicit model of future market
interactions or available journeys, but rather learns the optimal pol-
icy from repeatedly interacting with the environment and observing
realised costs and rewards.
Specifically, we employ the widely-used Q-Learning algorithm
[20] with an -greedy exploration strategy (see Appendix B for de-
tails). We hypothesise that this learning approach may be a good
approximation of how real users interact with the system, by trying
some preference reports, observing how the system responds and
then making small adjustments to their strategies (rather than rea-
soning about the optimal strategy). In fact, reinforcement learning
has been used as a computational model to explain learning and
decision-making behaviours in animals [9].
3. RESTRICTED MARKET INTERFACES
In practice, the drivers solving the above optimisation problem will
be humans, and, as we argued, they may not have the time or capac-
ity to act optimally. Neither of the solution approaches discussed
in the previous section are feasible for completely automating peo-
ple’s decision processes — the optimal solution requires full in-
formation about all possible future journeys, while reinforcement
learning requires a long training phase until it performs well.
Instead, we here focus on simplifying the market interface for
drivers. In particular, we use a range of interfaces that intention-
ally restrict the reporting space for the user (but without changing
the underlying market mechanism). Knowing which interface to
present to users can alleviate the cognitive burden, as the user has
to consider fewer options.
Given this, we denote the full space of possible reports in a fully
expressive interface by W = Rsmax≥0 . In the following, we will use
two approaches for restricting this space by providing the user with
an alternative set of reports, W ′, which maps to W through a func-
tion ω : W ′ → W , to determine the corresponding report that is
used by the charging agent. Both approaches rely on significantly
reducing the dimensionality of the decision space, while still re-
taining the ability for users to express a range of valuations.
3.1 SingleMarginal Value with Quantity (SMV)
The first restriction, SMV, reduces the driver’s possible reports to a
single marginal value md ∈ R≥0 and a maximum quantity qd ∈ N
she wishes to acquire. Here, md expresses the value she gains for
receiving each additional unit of electricity up to a total quantity of
qd. Thus, the space for this restriction isW SMV = R≥0×N and we
denote a report by wSMVd = (md, qd). The corresponding mapping
function is ωSMV(md, qd) = [md, 2md, 3md, . . . , qdmd].
The rationale behind providing this restriction is that it reduces
the dimensionality of the problem to two dimensions, which may be
significantly easier for a user to understand and solve. However, the
disadvantage of this approach is that the space of possible reports
is still infinitely large. While qd is discrete and restricted by the
battery size, md may take on arbitrary values.
3.2 Finite Set of Alternatives
In the second restriction (FINITE), which has been used in related
work [1, 17, 2], we select a finite subset of f alternatives from
the full report space, {α1, α2, . . . , αf} ⊂ W . The corresponding
restricted report space is then W FINITE = {1, 2, . . . , f}, such that
a report wFINITEi = x expresses the user’s choice of alternative αx,
i.e., ωFINITE(x) = αx.
The advantage of this restriction is that the driver has to consider
a very small number of alternatives. In practice, f can be chosen
to trade off the cognitive burden on the user with the expressiv-
ity of the space (typically, we envisage f to be a handful or less).
The alternatives could be chosen to represent a cross section of the
full report space, could be manually selected by domain experts or
could even be selected by an autonomous agent that adjusts these
alternatives to a particular user.
Note that both the optimal solution and the reinforcement learn-
ing approach can be adapted for the restricted interfaces through
appropriate discretisation. The details are in Appendices A and B
4. THE BID2CHARGE TESTBED
To test how human participants interact with our interfaces, and to
empirically determine which one works best, we designed a web-
based game called Bid2Charge, which replicates the EV charging
setting. We frame this as a game, as this is a low-cost, controlled
way of gathering data from large numbers of users in a short time.
In more detail, in Bid2Charge, the player takes the role of an
EV delivery van driver. This provides an intuitive explanation to
players of what journeys represent (in the game, journeys are re-
ferred to as delivery tasks and result in a certain payment), what
the objective of the game is (maximise overall profit) and what the
uncertainty means (delivery tasks may or may not come up on a
given day). We use an incentive-compatible auction based on the
well-known VCG mechanism [10] as the market mechanism in this
game, and so the player’s reports in each of the market interfaces
are framed as bids for this auction.2
Figure 1 shows the main game screen. At the top, there are some
general statistics, showing the player’s accumulated profit, the cur-
rent day and current SOC. Below that, on the left, there is a task
planning view. This provides the user with information about jd,
i.e., the tasks that are potentially available on the current day. Both
the value, vj , and the realisation probability, aj , are shown for each
task. Furthermore, the user can select subsets of tasks, j′ ⊆ j
to inspect both the total value (v(j′)) and the total cost (γ(j′)) if
those tasks are completed (here, γ(j′) is calculated based on the
Euclidean distance of the shortest route past all tasks in j′). Note
that interacting with this view does not affect the game — it simply
provides the player with information about the available tasks. In
Figure 1 the user has selected the $10 and $15 tasks and is informed
that this will require 11 kWh in total for a reward of $25.
The auction view, which is to the right of the task planning view,
2VCG fulfils the conditions for optimality in Section 2.1. It is dom-
inant strategy incentive compatible for the current day (while as-
suming a probabilistic model of prices on future days).
Figure 1: Main game view.
allows the player to submit their bid wd for the current day. The
view supports all three interfaces discussed in this paper, as shown
in Figure 2: FINITE, SMV and a fully expressive interface. Only
one of these is shown to each user. Here, the candidates for FINITE
in Figure 2a can be customised by the game administrator, but this
particular view shows [1, 2, 3, . . .], [2, 4, 6, . . .] and [4, 8, 12, . . .],
which we also use for our experiments. The view for SMV in Fig-
ure 2b shows a user entering the bidmd = 1.5, qd = 4. Finally, the
view for the fully expressive interface in Figure 2c shows a user en-
teringwd = [0, 0, 2, 2, 5.5, 5.5, 5.5, 10.5]. The user always has the
option to skip the auction. On pressing the “Run Auction” button,
they are informed of the outcome and then taken to a task view.
In the task view, representing the EV utilisation phase and shown
in Figure 3, the user is presented with the realisation of tasks for the
current day and can select their desired choice of tasks to complete.
The options for this are given as a table with corresponding rewards
and costs, and any dominated solutions are automatically removed.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The purpose of our experiments is to investigate how real human
users interact with the two restricted interfaces proposed in this pa-
per, as well as the fully expressive interface, and whether the choice
of a particular interface influences the performance of users. Our
approach is to evaluate this through a randomised, controlled ex-
periment, where we allocate market interfaces randomly to users,
in order to exclude self-selection bias. Participants were given in-
structions only for the particular interface they were assigned to and
were not told that others existed. In carrying out our experiments,
we were guided by two main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Players using more expressive interfaces achieve
the same or a higher profit than those using restricted interfaces.
Hypothesis 2: Players using more expressive interfaces spend
more time on the game than those using more restricted interfaces.
The first hypothesis is based on the fact that the more expressive
interfaces offer more possible reports to the players. Experimental
evidence also suggests that market user interfaces with more op-
tions lead to the same or better performance than those with fewer
options [17]. However, more expressivity may also incur a higher
cognitive burden, which is expressed by Hypothesis 2.
We tested these hypotheses through one initial experiment, where
we asked participants to play through a single game consisting of
30 days. To further explore how players learn and improve over
time, we carried out a second experiment, where we asked another
set of participants to play through three identical 10-day games in
(a) FINITE:
(b) SMV:
(c) Fully-Expressive:
Figure 2: Auction Bidding Panels.
sequence (although journeys and their probabilities were identical,
their realisations were not necessarily the same). In addition to val-
idating the results from the first experiment, the main hypothesis
we tested in the second setting was:
Hypothesis 3: Players using more complex interfaces improve
their profit more significantly over repeated plays of the game than
those using more restricted interfaces.
Furthermore, this more sequential setting allowed us to compare
the human learning trends to those of the reinforcement learning
agent we proposed in Section 2.4.
5.1 Player Recruitment
We recruited players from Amazon Mechanical Turk, a platform
that allows requesters to advertise tasks to a large audience of on-
line workers.3 We asked workers to first read a set of instructions
explaining the rules and objectives of the game, then they had to
give consent to participating in a study as well as answer three ba-
sic questions about the rules (to test their understanding). We told
workers the task would take about 25 minutes, they would receive
a base payment of $2.50 and then a bonus based on the profit they
made in the game. Specifically, in the first experiment, we offered
$0.02 for each $1.00 earned in the game, while (due to budget con-
straints) in the second experiment we offered $0.01 for each $1.00
earned in each of the three games. In both experiments, this was
capped at $3.00).4 This bonus was chosen to ensure that the incen-
tives of the player were aligned with the objective of the game.
We assigned participants to interfaces using a block randomisa-
tion scheme, to achieve a balanced spread of participants across
3http://www.mturk.com/
4This maximum was set to limit our potential spend. Only three
players managed to reach this.
Figure 3: Task view with actually available tasks.
the interfaces. To ensure players understood the game, they had
to correctly answer a short multiple-choice questionnaire. In the
first experiment, 130 workers played the game; while in the second
experiment 189 played three games each.
5.2 Experimental Parameters
To simulate the auction, we determine the marginal prices of units,
denoted by pd,x for the xth unit, using random distributions. These
are identical for all interfaces, on all days and for all participants
(but the prices were sampled independently each time). Specifi-
cally, each price was determined by first setting pd,0 = 0, and then
iteratively determining each pd,x as pd,x = pd,x−1 + x, where x
was drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.2x− 0.2, 0.4x+ 0.6).
The rising mean of this distribution ensures that marginal prices
for each unit generally increase. Given these prices, we then select
xd(wd) = argmaxx wd,x −
∑x
i pd,i.
The game in the first experiment was played for 30 simulated
days, and we varied the number of tasks every 1–4 days (with be-
tween 1–6 tasks available every day). We did not give players infor-
mation about tasks on future days (only the total number of days to
play), and there was no prior information about the distribution of
auction prices and allocation probabilities. This is reasonable be-
cause in real-world settings these would also be highly uncertain,
and because we did not want to overwhelm players with a large
amount of information. In the second game, a 10-day game was
played three times by each player, enabling some learning.
5.3 Benchmarks
To establish upper and lower bounds for the possible performance
of players, we compare them to a number of benchmarks: Opti-
mal is the optimal strategy assuming a fully expressive interface.
We also show two variants, Optimal (SMV) and Optimal (FI-
NITE), for the restricted interfaces. All of these are obtained by
solving the MDP. RandomGreedy is a benchmark that places a
random bid (chosen from the FINITE options) and then greed-
ily chooses the highest-value tasks. Finally, MaxGreedy places
a bid that is high enough to fully charge the EV each day and
then greedily chooses the highest-value tasks. These two represent
simple strategies that a worker could employ to complete the task
with as little effort as possible (thus representing a lower bound
on performance). Finally, we also show results for reinforcement
learning strategies corresponding to the three interfaces, QL(λ),
QL(SMV,λ) andQL(FINITE,λ), where λ is the number of episodes
the game has been played by the agent. This performance is ob-
tained by temporarily setting  to 0.
5.4 Results of First Experiment
We first consider the overall performance in terms of the overall
profit achieved, as this is the main objective of the game and to ver-
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Figure 4: Average profit in first experiment.
ify Hypothesis 1. Figure 4 shows this for the three interfaces with
human participants (in red, plain), for the three optimal policies
(in green, hatched), the two baseline benchmarks (in blue, finely
hatched) and the reinforcement learning agent after 100 and 25000
iterations of the game, which are representative of early and late
stages of learning (in orange, dotted). All results are shown with
95% confidence intervals. Focusing first on the performance of the
optimal (in green), it is interesting to note here that there is little
difference between the optimal performance in the restricted set-
ting (in particular for SMV) and the fully expressive setting. This
is encouraging, showing that, despite the severe restrictions, there
is little loss in the utility players could, in theory, achieve.
Considering the performance of human players, these are gen-
erally situated between the optimal and the baseline benchmarks.
Unsurprisingly, the humans perform significantly worse than a ra-
tional agent, given that the problem is highly complex due to its
inherent stochasticity and combinatorial nature. However, when
comparing the human players to the baseline benchmarks, there
is a marked improvement. This provides some evidence that the
participants are putting effort into the game rather than selecting
strategies that require the least effort.
When comparing the performance of the human players using
different market interfaces, several interesting trends emerge. First,
we note that the choice of mechanism seems to have a signifi-
cant influence on performance.5 Counter-intuitively, the players
using the fully expressive interface achieve the overall lowest per-
formance with an average profit of only $66.96, while players with
SMV achieve an average profit of $91.38 and players with FINITE
achieve an average $91.93.6 This constitutes an improvement of
over 35% compared to the fully expressive interface. This means
our Hypothesis 1 needs to be rejected. One possible reason why
the fully expressive interface does not perform as well is because
of its substantial cognitive burden, because users are faced with a
complex decision problem.
Considering the performance of the reinforcement learning agent,
several interesting trends emerge. First, the fully-expressive inter-
face consistently performs worse than the other two interfaces (with
the same amount of learning). This is because the extremely large
5This is confirmed by ANOVA with p = 0.001.
6A post-hoc Bonferroni test confirms that there is a significant dif-
ference between the fully expressive mechanism and each of the
other two (with p = 0.004). There is no significant difference be-
tween the performance of users with FINITE and SMV.
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Figure 6: Average time spent by players on auctions and journeys.
reporting space takes longer to explore than in the other two inter-
faces. Furthermore, after 100 learning episodes, the performance of
the reinforcement learning agent resembles that of human players,
indicating that it may be useful for predicting human behaviour.
Although there is no significant difference in profit between FI-
NITE and SMV for human players, interesting trends emerge when
considering the actual money that was spent on acquiring electric-
ity and how much was gained from completing tasks. This is shown
in Figure 5. Here, players using FINITE spent an average $208.44
acquiring electricity and achieved an average reward of $300.37. In
contrast, players using SMV spent only an average of $148.50 and
earned $239.89. The differences here are highly significant.7 Thus,
while the profit for both is similar, FINITE induces a very different
behaviour in the players — they spend significantly more on ac-
quiring electricity and are then able to use this to complete a larger
number of tasks. This is likely because SMV requires users to ex-
plicitly set a maximum number of units, thereby focusing them on
this parameter and implicitly suggesting they restrict this demand.
This is an interesting result, showing that significant changes in
behaviour can be caused by the right choice of mechanism. Es-
pecially in the energy domain, low overall consumption may be a
particularly desirable goal and SMV encourages this.
Next, to investigate Hypothesis 2, Figure 6 shows the time that
players spent on the auction and task screens. Participants using
the fully expressive interface spent the longest time on the auction
(689 minutes on average), while participants using FINITE spent
the least amount of time on the auction (502 minutes on average).
This supports the hypothesis.8
7ANOVA confirms this for both metrics with p ≤ 0.002. Post-hoc
Bonferroni tests confirm differences between FINITE and SMV
with p = 0.001.
8ANOVA (p = 0.026) and a Bonferroni test confirm a difference
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Figure 7: Average profit over number of learning episodes obtained
by reinforcement learning agent.
5.5 Results of Second Experiment
To further examine whether our proposed reinforcement learning
agent can be applied to optimising market user interfaces, we ran
the agent in the setting of the second experiment and identified
a small change to the FINITE strategy that led to an improve-
ment in the agent’s performance. Specifically, we decreased the
marginal valuation reported in the third alternative from $4/kWh to
$3/kWh. We used both alternatives in the second experiment, and
in the following, we will refer to interfaces FINITE(1,2,3) and FI-
NITE(1,2,4) to distinguish between these two. Figure 7 shows the
performance of the reinforcement learning agent over time using
the various interfaces.
Figure 8 shows the overall performance results from the second
experiment, grouped by the three games each player completed.
First, it is clear that there is a strong learning effect — on all treat-
ments, the players perform better over time. On the first game, there
is also a very clear performance difference between the interfaces.
Fully expressive performs worse (average profit $15.6) while SMV
performs best (average profit $26.8).9 However, participants on the
fully expressive interface then start to perform significantly better
on subsequent games, supporting Hypothesis 3. This is likely be-
cause they begin to exploit the higher expressivity of the interface.
At the same time, they are still taking significantly longer to delib-
erate during the auction phase (taking 373, 266 and 227 minutes for
the three games, compared to 178, 123 and 116 of FINITE(1,2,3)),
and they still do not outperform the restricted interfaces.
Finally, comparing the results with the predictions of the re-
inforcement learning agent, several trends are confirmed. First,
FINITE(1,2,3) indeed outperforms FINITE(1,2,4), validating the
agent’s predictions and indicating that our approach of optimising
the interface based on the agent’s response is sensible. This is par-
ticularly promising, because there is no discernible difference in
the optimal performance of the two interfaces (see Figure 8). Other
trends indicated by the agent are also confirmed: SMV consistently
performs well throughout, while the fully expressive interface ini-
tially performs poorly, but then catches up with the others as more
learning and exploration take place.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
As appropriate market mechanisms can efficiently allocate scarce
resources to competing consumers, they hold considerable promise
in addressing emerging challenges in the energy domain. How-
ever, in many realistic settings, including the EV charging problem,
between the expressive and FINITE (p = 0.021.)
9ANOVA (p = 0.006) and a Bonferroni test find a significant dif-
ference (p = 0.036) between these two.
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Figure 8: Average profit during each of the three games in the sec-
ond experiment, along with benchmarks.
there are non-expert participants. In this paper, we studied how the
cognitive burden on such participants can be alleviated by using
restricted market interfaces.
This paper’s extensive evaluation used a new framework called
Bid2Charge that allowed us to compare people’s behaviour in a
simulated EV charging setting and using a variety of interfaces. As
such, our work is the first comprehensive study of a wide spec-
trum of market interfaces, ranging from fully expressive to param-
eterised (SMV) to very limited (FINITE). In carrying out this study,
we found that using restricted market interfaces has several key ad-
vantages over standard fully expressive approaches. First, partici-
pants spend less time deliberating, which indicates a lower cogni-
tive burden. Second, these participants tend to perform better than
those using a fully expressive, theoretically optimal interface. This
performance gap is particularly pronounced during the first inter-
actions, and then gradually closes with experience. Third, partic-
ular types of interfaces induce different behaviours in participants,
while achieving the same utility. This could be a promising tool for
nudging people towards particularly desirable behaviours, such as
energy conservation. Last, we found that a reinforcement learning
agent was able to predict broad trends in the relative performance of
alternative interfaces. As such, we believe it constitutes a valuable
tool for the evaluation and optimisation of market user interfaces.
In future work, we plan to build on this framework and develop
new optimised interfaces that adapt to users. In particular, we will
extend the reinforcement learning agent proposed in this paper to
offer advice and support the user through autonomous decisions.
Last, it is important to note that while Bid2Charge was evaluated
using EV market mechanisms, it is a general framework which is
easily adapted to other markets. Along these lines, we plan to study
restricted interfaces and learning agents in other settings.
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APPENDIX
A. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
Here, we present the MDP formulation of the EV charging prob-
lem, describe an agent’s policies and present the optimal solution.
A.1 MDP Formulation
We formalise the EV charging problem from Section 2 as a tuple
(Σ,Σ′, J, jd∈D, rj∈J , vj∈J , γ,Xd∈D, Pd∈D), where:
• Σ = D× [0, smax] is the set of states before the market inter-
action, and Σ′ = D × [0, smax]× 2J is the set of states after
the market interaction (but before selecting from the avail-
able journeys). Both include the current day, d, and state of
charge, sd or s′d, while a state σ
′ ∈ Σ′ also includes the set
of available journeys j′d.
• J , jd, rj , vj and γ describe the journeys, their potential avail-
ability per day, realisation probabilities, values and journey
costs, as defined in Section 2.
• Xd : (W ×{0, 1, . . . , smax})→ [0, 1] is the probability dis-
tribution of xd, i.e.,Xd(wd, x) is the probability of obtaining
x units when reporting wd during a market interaction.
• Pd : W → R is the expected price of a market interaction
given a report, i.e., Pd(wd) = E [pd(wd)].
The actions, transition probabilities and rewards of this MDP are
fully described by the tuple above. Specifically, the available ac-
tions depend on the current state as follows. For σ ∈ Σ, the actions
are the reports in W . For σ′ = (d, s′d, j
′
d) ∈ Σ′, the set of actions
is {a ∈ 2j′d | γ(a) ≤ s′d}, i.e., all subsets of the available journeys
that can be completed with the current state of charge. Transition
probabilities from a state σ to a state σ′ are determined by the
chosen report wd and Xd (to determine s′d) and by jd and rj (to
determine j′d). Transitions from a state σ
′ to σ are deterministi-
cally given by the chosen action ad and cost function γ. Rewards
are incurred when transitioning from one state to the next, and they
correspond to the prices paid for electricity (negative) and the val-
ues derived from completing journeys (positive). Specifically, the
former is given by −Pd(wd), while the latter is
∑
j∈ad vj .
A.2 Agent Policy
An agent’s policy determines which preference vector to report for
the market interaction, and which journeys to complete, given the
current state. Thus, it is described by a tuple (pi, pi′), where pi :
Σ→W determines the reports and pi′ : Σ′ → 2J the journeys.
Given this, we can now define the expected utility of a policy
(pi, pi′) using a value function for each type of state. For state σ =
(d, sd) ∈ Σ:
V (d, sd, pi, pi
′) = −Pd(pi(σ)) +
smax∑
i=0
[
Xd(pi(σ), i)·∑
j′
d
⊆jd
R(j′d) V
′(d,min(sd + i, smax), j
′
d, pi, pi
′)
]
, (1)
where R(j′d) =
∏
j∈j′
d
rj
∏
j∈jd\jd(1− rj) is the probability that
j′d is the set of journeys available.
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For state σ′ = (d, s′d, j
′
d) ∈ Σ′, with d < n:
V ′(d, s′d, j
′
d, pi, pi
′) =[ ∑
j∈pi′(σ′)
vj
]
+ V (d+ 1, s′d − γ(pi′(σ′)), pi, pi′), (2)
while for the last day, V ′(n, s′n, j′n, pi, pi′) =
∑
j∈pi′(σ) vj .
10Note that while this definition of R(j′d) assumes independence
between journeys, it could be redefined to account for correlated
journey probabilities without changing the solution approach or its
computational complexity.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Solution
1: procedure FINDOPTIMAL
2: Initialise pi∗, pi′∗, V and V ′ to be empty
3: Initialise Γ to hold feasible charge levels given γ
4: for d ∈ {n, n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1} do
5: for s ∈ Γ do
6: for j′d ⊆ jd do
7: if d = n then
8: pi′∗(d, s, j′d) =
argmaxa⊆j′
d
| γ(a)≤s
∑
j∈a vj
9: else
10: pi′∗(d, s, j′d) =
argmaxa⊆j′
d
| γ(a)≤s
∑
j∈a vj
+V (d+ 1, s− γ(a), pi∗, pi′∗)
11: Calculate V ′(d, s, j′d, pi∗, pi′∗) using Equation 2
12: Calculate pi∗(d, s, pi∗, pi′∗) using Equation 4
13: Calculate V (d, s, pi∗, pi′∗) using Equation 1
14: return (pi∗, pi′∗)
A.3 Optimal Solution
Given the above definition, the optimal policy (pi∗, pi′∗) is simply:
(pi∗, pi′∗) = argmax
(pi,pi′)
V (1, sinitial, pi, pi
′), (3)
where sinitial is the initial state of charge. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3, this can be found using dynamic programming with back-
wards induction and by recognising that the agent’s best strategy is
to bid its true valuation for each level of electricity. This valuation
is given directly by V ′, such that:
pi∗(d, sd) =
[
V ′(d, sd + 1, pi
∗, pi′∗),
V ′(d, sd + 2, pi
∗, pi′∗), . . . , V ′(d, smax, pi
∗, pi′∗)
]
(4)
The full algorithm for computing the optimal policy is shown in
Algorithm 1. In order to obtain optimal policies for the restricted
interfaces, we can replace line 12 with the following:
13: w∗ = argmaxw∈W ′ −Pd(ω(w)) +
∑smax
i=0
[
Xd(ω(w), i)·∑
j′
d
⊆jd R(j
′
d) V
′(d,min(s+ i, smax), j′d, pi, pi
′)
]
14: pi∗(d, s) = ω(w∗)
For SMV, this requires a discretisation of the marginal value. In
our experiments, we use md ∈ {$0, $0.01, $0.02, . . . , $5}, which
is sufficiently fine-grained to lead to a near-optimal performance.
B. REINFORCEMENTLEARNINGAGENT
Algorithm 2 shows the reinforcement learning algorithm we use as
a more realistic benchmark than the optimal. This algorithm does
not need knowledge of the underlying MDP and instead uses a Q-
Learning approach to gradually learn the value of making partic-
ular reports in a given state (expressed using a Q(σ,w) function).
It takes three parameters: an exploration probability , a learning
rate parameter α, and the set of possible reports W . In the experi-
ments, we set  = 0.2 and α = 0.1 (our results are not particularly
sensitive to this choice). W is determined by the relevant interface.
In more detail, for each day d of each episode e, the agent first
senses the current state σ (line 6). It then selects a report to sub-
mit using the PICKREPORT function. This function depends on
the interface the agent is using. Algorithm 3 shows this for the
Fully-Expressive interface, while Algorithm 4 is used for FINITE
and SMV. Both approaches use an  parameter that balances ex-
ploration (choosing a random, potentially untested report) with ex-
ploitation (choosing the best-performing report). As discussed in
Section 2.4, the Fully-Expressive uses a local search technique to
Algorithm 2 Reinforcement Learning Agent
1: procedure QLEARNINGAGENT(, α,W )
2: Qˆ← {} . State/action pairs that have been tried
3: ∀σ ∈ Σ, w ∈ W : Q(σ,w)← 0 . Initialise Q-function
4: for e ∈ {1, 2, . . .} do . Episodes
5: for d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} do
6: σ ← SENSEAUCTIONSTATE()
7: w ← PICKREPORT(, σ,Q, Qˆ,W )
8: REPORT(w)
9: pd ← OBSERVECOST()
10: (d, s, j′d)← SENSEJOURNEYSTATE()
11: if d = n then
12: ad ← argmaxa⊆j′
d
| γ(a)≤s
∑
j∈a vj
13: else
14: ad ← argmaxa⊆j′
d
| γ(a)≤s
[ (∑
j∈a vj
)
+
argmaxw∈W Q((d+ 1, s− γ(a)), w)
]
15: v ←∑j∈ad vj
16: if (σ,w) /∈ Qˆ then
17: Q(σ,w)← v − pd
18: Qˆ← Qˆ ∪ {(σ,w)}
19: else
20: Q(σ,w)← Q(σ,w) + α · (v − pd −Q(σ,w))
21: if RANDOM(0,1) <  then
22: ad ∈ {a ⊆ j′d | γ(a) ≤ s} . Pick random journey set
23: COMPLETEJOURNEYS(ad)
generate new reports during exploration. Here, the MODIFYRAN-
DOMELEMENT(w) function takes a report w, sets one randomly
chosen element wi to a random number (in the experiments, this is
on the interval [0, 6i]), and then adjusts the other elements to ensure
the vector is non-decreasing, by decreasing elements before i and
increasing elements after i as necessary.
The agent then submits its chosen report, observes the incurred
cost in the market and the new state (lines 8–10). It then picks the
best set of journeys to complete, given the Q-values of states on
the following day (lines 11–14). These state transitions are deter-
ministic, given the costs of journeys, so we do not learn separate
Q-values for journey choices. However, note that most Q-values
for the next states will be zero initially, so the agent will start by
greedily completing journeys to maximise its immediate reward.
Next, the agent updates theQ-function for its chosen report based
on the overall profit achieved during the day (lines 15–20). Finally,
with a small probability , the agent picks a new random set of jour-
neys, which is again used for exploration; otherwise, it executes its
chosen set ad (lines 21–23).
Algorithm 3 Report Selection Function for Fully-Expressive
1: procedure PICKREPORT(, σ,Q, Qˆ,W )
2: q ← {w | (σ,w) ∈ Qˆ}
3: if RANDOM(0,1) <  ∨ |q| = 0 then
4: if |q| = 0 then
5: w ← [0, 0, . . . , 0] . smax elements
6: else
7: w ∈ q . Random report
8: return MODIFYRANDOMELEMENT(w)
9: else
10: return argmaxw Q(σ,w)
Algorithm 4 Report Selection Function for FINITE and SMV
1: procedure PICKREPORT(, σ,Q, Qˆ,W )
2: if RANDOM(0,1) <  then
3: return w ∈W . Random report
4: else
5: return argmaxw Q(σ,w)
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